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Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The
State of Israel et al: Landmark Human Rights
Decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice or
Status Quo Maintained?
"The State of Israel has been engaged in an unceasing struggle
for both its very existence and security, from the day of its
founding. Terrorist organizations have established as their goal
Israel's annihilation."
I. Introduction
In Israel, between January 1, 1996 and May 14, 1998, one
hundred twenty-one people died, and more than seven hundred
were injured in terrorist attacks "A large number of those killed
and injured were victims of harrowing suicide bombings in the
heart[s]of Israeli cities."3  The Israeli General Security Service
(GSS), also known as the Shin Bet, is the security police body
charged with investigating persons suspected of committing
crimes against Israeli security.4 GSS investigations often result in
interrogations of suspected terrorists.5 In the past, the GSS has
routinely employed physical pressure during interrogations,
particularly in instances where it sought to obtain information
about pending terrorist bombing attacks.6
I H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel et al.;
H.C. 4054/95, The Ass'n for Civil Rights in Israel v. Prime Minister et al; H.C. 5188/96,
Wa'al al-Ka'ka and HaMoked: Ctr. for Defence of the Individual v. Gen. Security
Service et al; HCJ 6536/96, Hatem Yusuf Abu Zaida (represented by Andre Rosenthal)
v. Gen. Security Service; H.C. 7563/97, 'Abd al-Rahman Ghaneimat and the Pub.
Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Defense et al; H.C. 7628/97, Fu'ad
'Awad Quar'an and the Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Minister of Defense et
al., Introduction (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.court.gov.il/mishpat/htmi/
en/verdict/judgment.rtf> [hereinafter Principal Case].
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Until recently, Israeli courts have declined to condemn the
Shin Bet's use of "moderate" physical means during its
investigations.7 In September of last year, however, the Israeli
High Court of Justice (HCJ) handed down a surprising decision in
which it held that the executive's methods of interrogation did not
comport with the laws of Israel.8
On September 6, 1999, in Public Committee Against Torture
in Israel v. The State of Israel,9 the HCJ unanimously held that
several types of physical interrogation methods used by the GSS
were illegal under current Israeli law. This was a surprising result
given the same court's apparent reluctance to find the same or
similar practices illegal in the past. '° In spite of this, the Court
appears to have left the door wide open for the Knesset (the Israeli
legislature) to pass a law legitimizing the very physical force that
the High Court struck down.
This Note will analyze the Israeli Supreme Court decision
under Israeli and international legal standards. Part II of the Note
will set forth the procedural disposition and the facts of the case.I"
Part III of the Note will review relevant Israeli and international
law, and discuss the binding or persuasive effects of each within
the Israeli legal system. 2 Part IV of the Note will discuss the
ramifications of the Israeli Supreme Court decision. 3 Finally, the
Note will conclude that the Israeli Supreme Court made the correct
decision under both Israeli and international law, but that the
decision may not be as landmark as it appears on first glance. 4
H. Statement of the Case
A. Petitioners and Procedural Disposition
Between 1994 and 1999, several Palestinians and three
I Michael Mandel, Democracy and the New Constitutionalism in Israel, 33 ISR. L.
REv. 259, 313 n.168 (1999).
8 See Principal Case, supra note 1.
9 Id.
10 See Mandel, supra note 7, at 313 n.168.
1 See infra notes 15-54 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 55-156 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 157-214 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
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prominent Israeli human rights groups filed a total of seven
applications with the HCJ challenging GSS interrogations and
methods. 5  The Palestinians claimed to have been subjected to
various physical abuses while under interrogation by the GSS 6
The human rights organizations filed public applications. 7 Taken
together, the applicants alleged that, (1) the GSS did not have the
necessary statutory authority to conduct any interrogations under
Israeli law, and (2) various physical methods of interrogation used
by the GSS were illegal under Israeli and international law."
Between May, 1998 and May, 1999 the HCJ convened three
hearings on the applicants' petitions.' 9 Pursuant to these hearings,
the HCJ issued an order nisi with respect to the applicants' claim
that physical interrogation is illegal.0  The order presumably
required the GSS to refrain from using the challenged physical
interrogation techniques until the HCJ ruled on the legality or
illegality thereofl On September 6, 1999, the HCJ issued its
unanimous, yet controversial, decision, holding that the GSS had
the power to conduct interrogations, but that it could not employ
the challenged physical interrogation techniques.22
B. HCJ Legal Basis of Decision
The applicants argued that the GSS could not conduct
15 See Court Ruling Banning Shin Bet Use of Force Draws Mixed Reviews,
MIDEAST MIRROR, Sept. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10277257.
16 See Principal Case, supra note 1, IN 3-7.
17 See id. 2; see also infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing
standing to bring public application).
18 See id. 2-7.
19 See Israel Violate Convention Against Torture (visited Mar. 15, 2000)
<http://www.Btselem.org>.
20 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 91 40. An English translation of the hearing
transcripts is unavailable, but it is evident from the principal case that the order nisi was
granted with respect to the second claim, because in the principal case, the order was
made permanent. See id. An order nisi is a temporary injunction that is repealed or
becomes permanent upon final disposition of the case. See infra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
21 No English translation of the actual order can be located, and the terms of the
order are not discussed in the principal case.
22 See Principal Case, supra note 1, IN 20, 40. From a procedural standpoint, the
HCJ simply made the temporary injunction on the use of physical force a permanent one.
See id. T 40.
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interrogations because no statute granted the organization the
authority. 3 The Court stated that an interrogation infringed on a
suspect's freedom because it mandated detention, and pursuant to
the Criminal Procedure Statute, "detentions and arrests [could]
only be conducted by [statute] or by virtue of express statutory
authorization . ,,24 The Court then found that the Criminal
Procedure Statute that granted interrogation powers to the regular
police also authorized the Minister of Justice to specify additional
individuals who could conduct interrogations.25  Because the
Minister had, in at least one instance, issued a decree granting
such power to several investigators within the GSS, the Court held
that the GSS was "tantamount" to the police in the eyes of the law,
and therefore the GSS as a whole had authority to conduct
26interrogations. The Court then considered whether the scope of
such interrogations "encompass[ed] the use of physical means. 27
Respondents (GSS investigators) conceded that during the
course of interrogating the Palestinian applicants, they had
employed physical means.2 ' The investigators applied physical
techniques pursuant to permanent GSS directives and senior GSS
personnel authorization.29  The authorized physical techniques
included: violently shaking suspects, forcing suspects to crouch
on the tips of their toes for long intervals, excessively tightening
handcuffs, depriving suspects of sleep, and placing suspects in the
"Shabach" position. 30  The shaking and the imposition of the
Shabach position are particularly severe. Shaking involves "the
forceful shaking of the suspect's upper torso, back and forth,
repeatedly in a manner which causes the neck and head to dangle
23 See id. [ 14. The HCJ's initial holding is of limited importance to this note
because it is entirely the result of domestic statutory interpretation and as such has little
relevance in international law. It will be given brief and final mention here.
24 Id. 18 (quoting the Criminal Procedure Statute (Powers of Enforcement-
Detention-1996) art. l(a)).




28 See id. 8.
29 See id.
3o See id. 1[9-13.
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and vacillate rapidly."3' A suspect in the "Shabach" position is
forced to sit in a small, low chair that is tilted forward.32 The
suspect's hands are tied behind the chair, a hood is placed over the
suspect's head, and extremely loud music is blasted into the
suspect's ears."
Respondents claimed that the challenged interrogation
methods were "indispensable to fighting and winning the war on
terrorism. 34 Respondents also argued that their methods were
sanctioned by the Landau Commission of Inquiry Report, as
grounded in the necessity doctrine which is codified as the
"necessity defense" under the Israeli Penal Law.35
The Court analyzed the legality of these physical techniques
against two principles of the "law of interrogation. '36  First, the
HCJ pronounced that an interrogation must be "reasonable,"37 and
"necessarily... free of torture, ... cruel, inhuman treatment...
and any degrading handling [of the suspect] whatsoever."3 The
HCJ stated that "[t]hese prohibitions are 'absolute.' ' 9 In contrast,
the court also recognized that "a reasonable investigation is likely
to cause discomfort . . . ,40 The Court concluded that the
challenged techniques violated these specific principles because
they caused physical harm, mental suffering, and harm to dignity
in excess of that allowed.4' The Court cited former Justice Landau
for the proposition that "[tihe interrogation practices of the police
in a given regime are indicative of a regime's very character.
'42
Finally, the HCJ addressed whether the "necessity defense"
provided a statutory justification for the use of these physical
31 Id.19.
32 See id. 10.
13 See id. Suspects sometimes remained in the "Shabach" position for several
hours. See id. 27.
34 Id. 19.
35 See id. 115.
36 See id. 23.




41 See id. [ 24-32.
42 Id. 22.
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means, which the Court deemed otherwise illegal. The Court
acknowledged that the "necessity defense" is available to
everyone, including GSS interrogators, once they are indicted. 3
The Court explained that this defense might allow a GSS
investigator to escape conviction for an improper interrogation,
where it could be shown that the improper methods used against a
suspect were necessary to save the investigator's life, or the lives
of others." The defense condones an otherwise illegal act based
upon an "after-the-fact" finding of necessity. 45 That, however, was
not at issue in the present case.
46
The Court held that respondents could not rely on the necessity
defense up front to "establish [and act on] permanent directives
setting out the physical interrogation means that may be used
under conditions of 'necessity.' 47 The defense cannot be the basis
on which to define a code of normative behavior.48 The Court also
stated that the Landau Commission, while authorizing the use of
"moderate" force against suspects, did not so authorize on the
basis of the necessity defense, as respondents had suggested.49
Rather, the Court stated that the proposed directives allowing for
the use of force under the Landau Commission were based simply
on the principle of employing a "lesser evil" to prevent a greater.5°
In its conclusion the court stressed that Israeli law prohibited
the challenged physical methods of interrogation, because (1) they
offended general notions of interrogation law, (2) they could not
be justified upon the necessity defense, and (3) no statutory
directive from the legislature to the executive authorized the use of
such means." The Court stated that the legislature could pass a
statute allowing the GSS to use physical interrogation methods,
but no such grant could be inferred from existing law.52 Also, the
41 See id. 34.
44 See id.
41 See id.
46 See id. 135.
47 Id.
48 See id. 136.
41 See id.
50 See id.
51 See id. 138.
52 See id. M] 37, 38.
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Court felt that the appropriateness of allowing for physical means
of interrogation, given Israel's security situation, "must be decided
by the legislative branch which represents the people" and any
debate should occur before the legislature." The Court did warn,
however, that any law passed by the legislature would have to
conform to section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. 4
HI. Background
A. Background and Procedural Disposition of Case
The Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of
Justice, is the court of first and only instance on administrative
matters in Israel." Individuals and groups of citizens may petition
the HCJ to challenge any government action or inaction.16  Any
applicant will have standing to petition the HCJ, whether a direct
infringement of a personal interest can be shown or not, so long as
the applicant can establish that "[an] issue [is] one of
predominantly public nature, or of constitutional importance. ' '
An individual challenging a government action must petition
the HCJ to issue an order nisi, which is a temporary injunction that
is repealed or becomes permanent upon final disposition of the
case.58 The order also serves as "a directive from the Court to the
government requiring that it show cause for the Court to lift the
temporary stay."59 In the principal case, the injunction against the
53 Id. 139.
14 See id.
55 See YAAcov S. ZEMOCH, POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE COURTS 22 (1976);
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 34 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds.,
1995). This power derives from section 15 of the Basic Law: Adjudication. See
SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY 383 (1994).
56 See Kitty 0. Cohen, The Future of Jerusalem: A Symposium: Temple Mount
Faithful-Amutah et. Al. v. Attorney-General Inspector-General of the Police Mayor
of Jerusalem Minister of Education and Cultural Director of the Antiquities Muslim
WAQF In the Supreme Court Sitting as the High Court of Justice [September 23, 1993]
M. Elon D.P., A. Barak J., and G. Bach J., 45 CAm. U. L. REv. 861, 862 (Spring 1996).
51 Shetreet, supra note 55, at 384 (citing H.C. 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of
Defence 42 (2) P.D. 441).
58 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 40 (ordering that the order nisi be made
permanent).
59 Mark Allison, Note and Comment: The Hamas Deportation: Israel's Response
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government became permanent upon the Court's finding that the
challenged interrogation practices were illegal." A decision by the
HCJ is final and may not be appealed.6 However, most decisions
by the HCJ can effectively be rendered moot by an act of the
Knesset,62 so it is important to review the basics of Israeli
judicial/legislative interaction.
The HCJ occupies an odd position as a "constitutional" court,
because Israel does not have a true constitution.6 ' The Knesset,
pursuant to a directive in the Israeli Declaration of Independence,
began to draft a constitution, but it resolved to do so "in a
piecemeal fashion through [the drafting] of a series of basic
laws." 64 Although the Knesset has passed a number of basic laws,
these laws do not state that they are "normatively superior to
ordinary legislation," and the HCJ has generally been reluctant to
imply such superiority.65  In fact, the Court has held that "in a
clash between a special provision in ordinary Knesset legislation,
and a general provision in a basic law, the former prevails.,
66
The HCJ has also refused to recognize general principles in the
Declaration of Independence as having constitutional status via
their position in that declaration.67 Principles such as basic rights,
equality, and freedom of religion and conscience are recognized as
judge-made or common law "soft rights," but in general, they
alone cannot form the basis for invalidating legislative acts.66
to Terrorism During the Middle East Peace Process, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
397, 419 (Fall 1994).
60 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 40.
61 See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 55, at 34.




66 ITZHAK ZAMIR AND ALLEN ZYSBLAT, PUBLIC LAW IN ISRAEL 144 (1996) (citing
Ngev .v State of Israel (1974) 28 (1) PD 640).
67 See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 55, at 39.
68 See id. at 45-46; ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, 142-143. Despite its
reluctance to strike down ordinary Knesset legislation as contrary to the Basic Laws, the
HCJ has a strong activist reputation as having developed "soft" rights, in the absence of a
formal constitution, via "quasi-activist" interpretation of the basic laws. See, e.g., Yoav
Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers and Human Rights: The Case of Israeli
High Court of Justice during the Intifada, 33 L. & Soc'Y REv. 319, 322-324 (providing
examples of quasi-activst decisions). The HCJ enjoys "a high degree of trust among the
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Absent a formal constitution, or set of basic laws that serve as a
yardstick against which to measure the legality of lesser "ordinary
legislation," judicial review of legislative actions in Israel is
virtually nonexistent.69
There is, however, at least one exception to the HCJ's general
inability to review the legality of legislation passed by the
Knesset, and it is particularly relevant to a discussion of the
principle case. In 1992, the Knesset enacted the Basic. Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, and the Supreme Court subsequently
declared it to have constitutional status. ° The Supreme Court has
stated that this particular basic law can be used to measure the
legality of "lesser" ordinary legislation passed by the Knesset 1
B. The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
Although the Israeli Knesset has been trying for years to enact
a general Bill of Rights, opposition from special interests to one
measure or another has left the task unfinished.72 Two new basic
laws passed in 1992, however, constitute grants of those not-so-
controversial rights that would traditionally be part of a Bill of
Rights.73 The only one that is of concern here is the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty.
The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty protects
individual rights in life, body, dignity, 4 property,75 and privacy. 6
Section 11 of this basic law expressly provides "that all
governmental authorities are bound to respect the rights protected
Jewish-Israeli public." Id. at 325 (citing approval statistics).
69 See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 55, at 45. The Knesset
considered but apparently declined to adopt a Basic Law: Legislature, which would have
"grant[ed] entrenched status to all basic laws and [] grant[ed] the Supreme Court
jurisdiction as a constitutional court." Id. at 57.
70 See ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 145-46 (citing United Mizrachi Bank
Ltd. v. Migdal Co-operative Village (C.A. 6821/93, not yet reported)).
71 See id. Section 10 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and-Liberty provides that
only laws passed after this basic law need be consistent with its provisions. See Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) § 10.
72 See ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 141-42.
13 See id.
71 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) §§ 2, 4. The rights of life
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under the law."" Section 8 of the law states:
There shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except
by a law fitting the values of the State of Israel, designed for a
proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required or by
such a law enacted with explicit authorization therein."
Taken together, sections 8 and 11 of this basic law suggest that
it is designed to convey some degree of judicial oversight on the
legislative power of the Knesset. In 1995, the Israeli Supreme
Court announced the scope of that oversight in the civil case of
United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Co-operative Village.79
In United Mizrachi Bank, pursuant to legislation passed after
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty came into effect,
certain creditors' rights against agricultural settlements were
adversely affected. 0 The creditors argued that the new law
violated their property rights under section 3 of the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, and that the law did not meet the
requirements of section 8.81 The Court upheld the law, stating that
while it did violate the creditors' section 3 rights, the law
nevertheless complied with section 8.82 Although the Court could
have stopped there, it continued to hold that the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty is the equivalent of a formal
constitutional law. 3 That being the case, the Court went on to
declare that it could invalidate any legislation passed since this
basic law came into effect on the grounds it violated a protected
right and did not comply with section 8 of the law. "
In concluding these remarks about the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, it should be noted that section 9 appears to
indicate that Israeli police and defense forces cannot be held to
violate individual rights under this basic law, at least not when
77 Id. at § 3.
78 Id. at § 7,
79 See ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 145 (citing United Mizrachi Bank Ltd.




83 See id.; see also Dotan, supra note 68, at 324 (discussing public approval for
High Court activism in Israel).
84 See ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 146.
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acting for the state. 5 Section 9 reads as follows:
There shall be no restriction of rights under this Basic Law held
by persons serving in the Israeli Defence Forces, the Israel
Police, the Prisons Service and other security organizations of
the state .... 86
While there is virtually no commentary or apparent case law
interpreting this provision, section 9 appears to exempt certain
state actors, such as the GSS, from coverage under the Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty.
C. The Landau Commission and The Defense of Necessity
Pursuant to the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1968, the
President of the Israeli Supreme Court shall, at the request of the
Israeli government, appoint commissions to "investigate major
public controversies. 87 The government defines the scope of a
particular inquiry.88 In 1987, such an official commission, headed
by Justice Moshe Landau, was established and charged with
investigating GSS investigation methods.89 The results of its
investigation were published in what is commonly referred to as
the Landau Commission Report.90
The Commission concluded that, "effective activity by the
GSS to thwart terrorist acts is impossible without the use of the
tool of the interrogation of suspects, in order to extract from them
vital information known only to them and unobtainable by other
methods."9' The Commission further concluded as follows:
[t]he effective interrogation of terrorist suspects is impossible
without the use of means of pressure, in order to overcome an
obdurate will not to disclose information and to overcome the
fear of a person under interrogation that harm will befall him
from his own organization, if he does reveal information ....
The means of pressure [used in an interrogation] should
85 See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992) § 9.
86 Id.
87 SHETREET, supra note 55, at 483.
88 See id
89 See id. at 488.
90 See id.
91 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION
OF THE GSS REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (1987) 4.6, excerpts reprinted in,
23 ISR. L. REv. 146, 184 (Spring/Summer 1989) [hereinafter Landau Report].
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principally take the form of non-violent psychological pressure
through a vigorous and extensive interrogation, with the use of
stratagems, including acts of deception. However, when these
do -not attain their purpose, the exertion of a moderate measure
of physical pressure cannot be avoided. GSS investigators
should be guided by setting clear boundaries in this matter, in
order to prevent the use of inordinate physical pressure
92
arbitrarily administered by the interrogator.
The Commission went on to provide guidelines for the use of
"moderate" force.93 The government, and in particular the GSS,
adopted the commission's recommendations and guidelines in
their entirety.94
In an effort to justify the use of "moderate" force, the
Commission sought to balance evils.95 In an example of balancing,
the Commission developed a hypothetical in which a bomb had
been planted in an unknown public place.96 The Commission
asserted that it might constitute the lesser of two evils to torture a
suspect in order to extract the location of the bomb, so lives could
be saved.97 The Commission concluded that whether the bomb
had been set to go off in five minutes, or in five days should be
considered immaterial given that the relevant inquiry is not a
function of expediency, but rather a simple matter of weighing one
evil against the other.98 Israeli legal scholars heavily criticized this
analysis, because it suggested that force beyond what is
objectively moderate might be employed, and cut against another
more specific justification for the use of force cited by the
Committee-reliance on "necessity." 99
92 Id. §§ 4.6-4.7, at 184-85.
93 See id. (referencing guidelines set forth later in the document). Those guidelines
were kept confidential. See Aryeh Dayan, Features-The Slide Down the Slippery
Slope, HA'ARETZ, Jan. 18, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7217126.
94 See Landau Report, supra note 91, § 4.13, at 186.
95 See id. § 3.15, at 173.
96 See id. at 174.
97 See id.
98 See id.
99 See Mordecai Kremnitzer, The Landau Report-Was the Security Service
Subordinated to the Law, or the Law to the "Needs" of the Security Service?, 23 ISR. L.
RaV. 216, 253 (Spring/Summer 1989). Expediency or immediacy had generally been a
requisite for successful assertion of necessity. See id.
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Although the Landau Report acknowledged that Israeli law
had yet to address what it regarded as specific justifications for the
use of torture during GSS interrogations, it attached "great
importance" to the defense of "necessity."' °  The defense of
"necessity" is codified in article 34(1) of the Israeli Penal Code,
and reads as follows:
A person will not bear criminal liability for committing any act
immediately necessary for the purpose of saving life liberty,
body or property, of either himself of his fellow person, from
substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the particular
state of things [circumstances], at the requisite timing, and
absent alternative means for avoiding the harm.01
The Commission read this necessity defense as having codified
its "balancing evils" approach.0 2 Legal critics, however, assaulted
this interpretation on two grounds. The Commission relied on a
"necessity" defense while rejecting the requirement that the danger
be immediate.' 3 This violates the statutory requirement that the
threat of "serious harm" be "imminent," and it flies in the face of
the worldwide historical understanding of the defense. 1°4  The
more significant criticism of the "necessity" defense as a
justification for the use of physical interrogation methods is the
one relied on by the HCJ in the principal case, namely that there is
no generally existing situation of necessity such that the defense
can serve as a basis for a grant of governmental authority.0 5 It is
argued that the necessity defense is "based on the unique, isolated
and extraordinary character of a situation," and applies ad hoc to
justify an otherwise criminal response to dangerous circumstances,
after the fact.'O Despite the significant criticism of the Landau
Report, it nevertheless governed GSS interrogation procedures
'oo Landau Report, supra note 91, § 3.8, at 167.
'o' Principal Case, supra note 1, 33 (quoting Penal Code art. 34(1)).
102 See S. Z. Feller, Not Actual "Necessity" But Possible "Justification"; Not
"Moderate" Presure But Either "Unlimited" or "None At All", 23 ISR. L. REv. 201, 204
(Spring/Summer 1989).
103 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
"o4 See Kremnitzer, supra note 100, at 244-45 (citing historical approaches to the
defense including that advocated by Thomas Aquinas).
105 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text; see also Kremnitzer, supra note
100, at 238.
106 Kremnitzer, supra note 99, at 238-39.
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prior to the HCJ decision in the principal case, and to some extent
still does.
D. International Agreements and Cases
In the principal case, the HCJ did not need to reach the merits
of the applicants' international law claims because the contested
practices were found illegal under Israeli law. In spite of this, the
validity of the challenged practices under international law appears
to have been hotly contested by the parties in their briefs.' 7
Customary international law, as defined in Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, is automatically
incorporated into Israeli law, "without need of any act of
transformation" or ratification by the Knesset, unless that
international law contradicts existing Israeli law.' °8 If international
law is in conflict with domestic law, the domestic law will
trump.'09 Customary law is loosely defined as having to be
"proven and accepted by an overwhelming majority of states.""0
Despite the fact that Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice approves reliance on "international
conventions, whether general or particular,"'' . Israeli law
automatically incorporates only those conventions which are
declaratory of customary international law, and to which Israel is a
signatory.12 Barring legislative action to incorporate a
conventional international law principle or treaty provision into a
domestic law, such conventional international law is not
107 See, e.g., B'TSELEM, DRAFT POSITION PAPER: LEGISLATION ALLOWING THE USE
OF PHYSICAL FORCE AND MENTAL COERCION IN INTERROGATIONS By THE GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE, 23 (citing international law arguments made by the state in its briefs)
(last visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www2.iol.co.il/communikit/htmlarticles/18/
eposition> [hereinafter Position Paper].
10 Introduction to the Law of Israel, supra note 55, at 386. Article 38 sets forth the
law to which the International Court of Justice may look to when adjudicating disputes.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38. <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm> (visited March 20, 2000).
109 See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 55, at 386.
110 Id. at 386.
"I Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(a) <http:icj-
cij .org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm>
12 See Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein, Israel, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY 217, 219 (Craig M. Bradley ed. 1999).
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technically Israeli law." 3  Israeli legal scholars stress, however,
that while Israeli courts are not bound to do so, they will typically
invoke the presumption that the Knesset did not intend to violate
the international obligations of the State of Israel. 14 As a result,
most international conventions to which Israel is a party
"effectively become part of Israeli domestic law.""' 5  With this
framework in mind, it is now necessary to discuss those treaties
and international law principles that speak to the various forms of
physical interrogation methods used by the GSS in the principal
case.
The United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 prohibits the use of torture, and cruel or degrading treatment
or punishment." 6  Although not legally enforceable, the
declaration has served as a springboard for several legally binding
conventions."7 It should be remembered that even where Israel is
a party to these conventions, they are not necessarily "declaratory
of customary law," and if not formally adopted into law by the
Israeli legislature, they are not technically part of Israeli law. 18
1. U.N. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
In 1991, Israel ratified the UN International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, of 1966 (UN Covenant on Civil Rights)." 9
Article 7 of that covenant states that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.' 120  The UN Human Rights Committee, which is
113 See id. at 219.
114 See id. Even the Landau Report indicated that it "aimed to comply with the
various international conventions to which Israel is a party." See Landau Report, supra
note 91, § 3.21.
I" Harnon & Stein, supra note 112, at 219.
116 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217 A(1 11) (visited May
14, 2000) <http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/lang/eng.htm>; see also Position Paper, supra
note 107, at 18.
117 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 18.
118 See Harnon & Stein, supra note 112, at 219.
119 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 18.
120 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, 1966 U.N.
Jurid. Y.B. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/4. The language of this article is borrowed in its
entirety from article 5 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. See Position Paper,
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composed of international law specialists, and operates pursuant to
the covenant, made the following remarks with respect to the
scope of article 7:
[T]he text of article 7 allows of no limitation . . . even in
situations of public emergency . . . no derogation from the
provision of article 7 is allowed . . . no justification or
extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation
of article 7 for any reasons .... "'
Additional rules adopted by the UN serve to provide guidance
in implementing article 7. For example, article 5 of the Code of
Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted in 1979, forbids
law enforcement personnel from inflicting or tolerating "torture, or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" regardless of
whether the personnel do so under orders from superiors or even
under threat to national security."' Pursuant to the UN Human
Rights Committee's General Comment to article 7, the prohibition
in the article 'seeks to protect the physical and mental integrity of
the individual ... [and] relates not only to acts that cause physical
pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering .. ,,,23 The
Human Rights Committee once reviewed the physical
interrogation practices of the Israeli GSS to measure compliance
with the covenant. 124 In its 1998 compliance report, the committee
stated that "the methods of handcuffing, hooding, shaking and
sleep deprivation ... used ... either alone or in combination...
violate[d] article 7 of the covenant. 1 2
2. U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment Or Punishment
Also in 1991, Israel ratified the UN Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
supra note 107, at 18.
121 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 19 (quoting Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 20 (44) (art. 7). U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 40(A/47/40), Annex VI
(1994).
122 Id. (citing Terrorism: Taking of Hostages, December 17, 1979, Multilateral,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081).
123 Id. at 26 (quoting Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20 (44) (art.
7), U.N. GAOR Sup. No. 40(A/47/40), Annex VI (1994)).
124 See id. at 27.




Punishment (Convention against Torture), which had been adopted
by the UN General Assembly in 1984.126 Article 2(1) of the
convention requires that "[e]ach state party take effective
legislative, administrative, and judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture under any territory under its jurisdiction.'
Article 2(2) and 2(3) work an absolute ban on the use of, or
authorization of the use of torture by party states, even during war
or national emergency."'
The term "torture" is defined in article 1 of the convention as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession ... or intimidating him or a third person ... when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
129person acting in an official capacity ....
The other, debatably lesser forms of treatment or punishment
named in the title to the convention are not mentioned in article 1
of the convention. 
130
The drafting parties to the convention failed to agree on
whether or not to absolutely prohibit both torture and "other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.' 3' The U.S. and
Swiss delegations urged that one cannot draw a line between
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading acts,
whereas the former Soviet Union argued that the two types of
actions were legally distinct.3 2  The nations never resolved the
conflict and the convention only expresses an absolute prohibition
on the use of torture as defined in article 1.133
This does not mean that the convention is silent as to all acts
126 See id. at 19.
127 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39" Sess., 93" mtg., art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. A/ResI39/46
(1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
128 See id. art. 2(2) and 2(3).
129 Id. art. 1(1).
130 See 51 AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR ENFORCEMENT 6 (1999).
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that do not rise to the level of torture, as defined in article 1.
Article 16 requires that parties "undertake to prevent acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture" when such acts are committed by the state.
1 4
"Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is not
defined in the convention.'35 There is also no corresponding
prohibition on the use of these acts, as there is in article 2, with
respect to acts that constitute torture.
136
Finally, article 17 of the Convention against Torture
established the Committee Against Torture (CAT), which is
charged with the administration of the convention's enforcement
mechanisms. 37 The CAT is composed of ten members elected by
the party nations, who investigate and report on the extent to
which the various party nations are in compliance with the terms
of the convention.'38 On at least two occasions, the CAT reviewed
the GSS physical interrogation methods allowed under the Landau
Commission.39 In each case, the methods of interrogation in
question resembled those before the HCJ in Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel.'40  In both instances, the CAT
determined that the methods violated article 16 of the Convention
Against Torture, as cruel, inhuman, or degrading, and that the
methods rose to the level of torture under article 1.4' The CAT
therefore rejected Israeli defenses based on "necessity" because
article 2 of the convention allows for no defenses.'
2
3. Cases Under the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
This section on international law and conventions will close
134 Convention Against Torture, supra note 127, art. 16.
131 Position Paper, supra note 107, at 24.
136 See Convention against Torture, supra note 127, art. 16. This article
incorporates articles 10-13 but not article 2, which bars torture in all cases. See id.
13' See BOULESBAA, supra note 131, at 240, 252.
138 See id. at 238, 252-54.
131 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 25-26.
140 See id. Methods reviewed included violent shaking and the "Shabach" method.
See id.




with a discussion of European human rights law. European human
rights law is important, not because it is binding on Israel, but
because the European system is "the most developed and effective
in the world on this subject"'143 and it is based in large part on
judicial interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which espouses protections
very much akin to those set forth in the above mentioned
international agreements, to which Israel is a party. European
human rights law serves as the basis for certain portions of the
Landau Report.'"
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms states that "no one shall be subjected to
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."' 45 The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly
interpreted this provision of the convention as working an absolute
bar, not only on torture, but also on acts which amount to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.1 46 The oft quoted statement
of the rule in Aksoy v. Turkey, reads:
Article 3, . . . enshrines one of the fundamental values of a
democratic society. Even in the most difficult of circumstances,
such as the fight against organized terrorism or crime, the
Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment .... Article 3 makes no
provision for exceptions and no derogation.., even in the event
of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.
4 1
The question under the European Convention then becomes, what
acts amount to "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment?"
In an obvious violation, the ECHR held in Aydin v. Turkey that
143 Id. at 20.
144 See also Landau Report, supra note 91, § 3.22, at 186. The Commission
attempted to square the use of force with the prohibitions of torture and ill treatment
under the international agreements to which Israel is a party by noting that the European
Court of Human Rights, while holding that the combined practices of head bagging,
sleep deprivation, and diet restriction constituted ill treatment, had not determined that
each practice alone did so. See id.
145 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3
(September 1953).
146 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 21.
147 Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 553, 585 (1997); see
also Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652, 699
(1999).
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Turkish Security Police had tortured a teenaged Kurdish detainee
when they raped, blindfolded, and beat her while in custody.1
41
The ECHR further held that each of these actions alone would
have amounted to torture. 149 The court noted that the "special
stigma of 'torture' [attached] only to deliberate inhuman treatment
causing very serious and cruel suffering."'"0
In Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, the ECHR held that ill
treatment must rise to a certain level of severity to fall within the
scope of "inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment"
prohibited by article 3."' That level of severity is to be based on
the totality of the circumstances in a given case." The Court
found a violation where Turkish Security Police detained several
applicants and forced them to watch as their homes were
deliberately burned to the ground. 113  A similar violation on
grounds of ill treatment was found in Assenov and Others v.
Bulgaria, where the facts were inconclusive as to whether a
juvenile detainee had been beaten by the police or by his father,
but where it was clear that the police had not sufficiently
investigated the allegations against their own department.
15 4
Rough arm twisting during a difficult arrest that causes shoulder
injury, or the imposition of solitary confinement and a restricted
diet for short periods of time as a means of prisoner discipline, do
not rise to the level of ill treatment prohibited by article 3.'
IV. Significance of the Case
Despite its general reluctance to review legislative actions, the
Israeli HCJ does enjoy an activist reputation when it comes to
developing judge-made "soft" rights or freedoms, in the absence
148 See Aydin v. Turkey, App. No. 23178/94,25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 251,295-96 (1997).
149 See id. at 296.
"I Id. at 295. Because both torture and ill-treatment are absolutely prohibited by
article 3, the only reason to distinguish the two appears to be for purposes of setting
remedies for the victim. See id.
151 Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, 26 EHRR 477 (Decision) 76 (1998).
152 See id
153 See id. 77-83.
'"I Assenvo and Others v. Bulgaria, App. No. 24760/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 652,
700-02 (1999).
155 See Klaas v. Germany, App. No. 15473/89, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305 (1994); see
also McFeeley v. United Knigdom, App. No. 8317/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161 (1981).
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of a formal Bill of Rights. 156 The Court is highly trusted and
regarded by the Israeli people, and it is "well known as an
incorruptible and impartial arbiter between the Israeli government
and its citizens."1" The Court's decision in Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel is significant on three levels.
First, the immediate effect of the decision has been to restrict
the way the GSS conducts interrogations under current Israeli
law.58  Second, the decision has fostered widespread debate
among the people of Israel and within its legislature as to whether
the legislature should expressly legalize the use of force by GSS
interrogators during interrogations 9  Finally, the decision is
significant as a very small step toward Israeli compliance with
international law and Israeli obligations under its international
agreements.' 6' The significance of the case in each of these regards
will be discussed in turn.
61
A. Immediate Effects of the Decision
In Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, the HCJ held
that the Israeli GSS has the same authority as regular police to
conduct interrogations. 62  The HCJ also held that various GSS
interrogation practices, such as shaking and the imposition of the
"Shabach" position, which were sanctioned under the Landau
Report, are illegal because they violate ordinary law governing
interrogations, and because no other existing law grants the
authority to use such methods. 63  The HCJ also rejected any
attempt to base directives allowing the use of physical
interrogation techniques on the codified defense of "necessity.
' 64
On its face, this decision seems to undermine the
recommendations set forth in the Landau Report, as adopted by
the Israeli government. The Landau Report may yet, however,
156 See Dotan, supra note 68, at 322-24.
17 Cohen, supra note 56, at 862.
158 See infra notes 162-86 and accompanying text.
15' See infra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
161 See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
161 See infra notes 162-213 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
163 See Principal Case, supra note 1, U]1 9-13, 20-42.
14 See id. In 35-36.
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have some procedural significance.
The HCJ only struck down the use of several specific physical
interrogation techniques used by the GSS.'65 Also, in the Court's
eyes, the Landau Report did not justify the use of force on the
basis of "necessity."'' 66 Therefore, the Court's decision appears not
to interfere with other physical interrogation practices that may
continue under the Landau Commission guidelines, because they
have yet to be challenged, and because they are not based on a
defense that the court has already rejected. In other words, the
GSS may continue to use force during interrogations, so long as it
does not employ the particular methods that the HCJ held illegal.
Barring the passage of a law authorizing the use of force,
consistency dictates that other methods should be struck down.
167
Human rights groups trumpet the principal decision as a
landmark victory-"a very important step."'' 68  In a sense, the
decision is groundbreaking because it is the first time the Israeli
HCJ has condemned any physical means of interrogation used by
the GSS and, more significantly, the Court condemned practices
recommended by the Landau Commission. 16 9 The Court, however,
noticeably narrowed its holding. It declined to exercise the same
judicial activism it exhibited in United Mizrachi Bank, where it
held that the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was
constitutional in stature, and as a result this decision is not as
groundbreaking as it might have been."'70
The HCJ decision was further limited because it held only that
the GSS physical interrogation methods were illegal under
165 See id. 40. In dicta found in paragraph 39, the Court suggests that the decision
serves to prohibit the use of force during interrogations. See id. The order nisi, however,
is only made permanent with respect to the challenged methods of force. See id.
166 See id. 136.
167 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing ordinary interrogation
law principles).
168 Israel-Court ruling banning Shin Bet Use of Torture Draws Mixed Reactions,
supra note 15 (discussing the liberal Israeli reaction to the decision and quoting the U.N.
High Commissioner on Human Rights).
169 See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 7, at 313 n.168.
170 Recall United Mizrachi Bank, where the HCJ held that there was not violation of
section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. Nevertheless, the Court went
on without prompting to state that the basic law was constitutional in stature. See ZAMIR
& ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 145-46 (citing United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Co-
operative Village (C.A. 6821/93, not yet reported).
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ordinary Israeli law.' The Court did not reach the legality of the
methods under international law, although both parties argued that
issue in their briefs.' The Court also did not address the legality
of the methods under the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
which is superior to the ordinary law.'73 It is true that section 9 of
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty does not allow the
Court to review the actual physical police practices under that
law, 174 but because section 8 allows for judicial review of the grant
of the power to use those practices,'75 the door was open for the
Court to convey some parameters to the legislature-it declined to
do so.
The Court invited the legislature to speak directly to the
legality of the GSS interrogation methods, so long as any resulting
law fit the values of the state of Israel, was designed for a proper
purpose, and worked no greater infringement on human dignity
than was necessary and authorized. 7 6  The Court had an
opportunity to tell the legislature how it would gauge compliance
with these section 8 requirements upon judicial review, but the
Court remained silent. It is conceded that the Court has never
been required to give the legislature such guidance."'77 The Court
also has no duty to tell the legislature that certain physical
methods of interrogation might always be "greater than necessary"
and therefore violative of the Basic Law. The Court did not
have to instruct the legislature regarding conventional treaty
171 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 1M 20, 38-40.
172 See, e.g., Position Paper, supra note 107, at 23 n.46-67 (discussing the State's
argument for a narrow interpretation of "torture" in international law); see also Principle
Case, supra note 1, at V 14-15.
173 See Principle Case, supra note 1.
174 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
176 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 1 39 (stating that any new legislation must
comport with the requirements of section 8 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty).
177 See INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 55, at 64-68 (discussing
the fact that the scope of judicial review by HCJ is largely within the Court's discretion,
so it could elect to give or, one assumes, not give guidance to the legislature regarding
possible future legislation).
178 See id.; see also ZAMIR & ZYSBLAT, supra note 66, at 142-43.
20001 677
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
obligations or even customary international law.'79 The Court
could have taken this additional activist step just as it did in United
Mizrachi Bank, 8 o however, and had it done so, its opinion would
have sent a stronger message to the legislature, condemning the
use of force. As this narrow decision stands now, it has been
criticized as an order to the legislature to legitimize torture rather
than a decision condemning the practice. 8'
The opinion in the principle case has placed the final
resolution of this issue within the hands of the legislature. The
HCJ states that, whether or not GSS interrogators should be
allowed to use force during interrogations is a political issue to be
determined by the elected representatives of the Israeli people.8 2
Whether or not this is a sincere belief, or simply the Court shirking
its responsibility on a difficult issue is debatable, given its
reputation for activism,'83 and the willingness of other courts such
as the European Court of Human Rights to decide similar types of
cases. 8 4  Whatever the case, the HCJ has at least given the
legislature an ultimatum-if the elected representatives want these
physical interrogation practices to continue, and their use is in the
best interest of the citizens and the state of Israel, then a law must
be passed.' The HCJ reserved the right to review such a law as
against the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.'
8 6
B. In The News-Legislative Response to the Decision
On the heels of the HCJ decision in Public Committee Against
Torture in Israel the GSS and several notable public figures called
179 See id.
180 See id
181 See Mandel, supra note 7, at 313 n.168.
182 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
183 See Dotan, supra note 68, at 322-24. The HCJ has jurisdiction to deal with any
public matter that comes before it, and pursuant to this wide grant of authority, "the
doctrine of non-justiciability can only be a product of self-restraint." Introduction to the
Law of Israel, supra note 55, at 68.
184 See, e.g., supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text (citing ECHR case law on
this subject); see also Position Paper, supra note 107, at 20-22 (citing the same).
185 See Principle Case, supra note 1, at 3. Presumably, the HCJ will find most
forms of physical interrogation violative of at least ordinary law until the legislature
passes a valid law stating otherwise. See id.
186 See Principal Case, supra note 1, [ 39.
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for the legislature to pass a law granting security police the
authority to use physical methods of interrogation. 8 7 A draft bill
of a law (called the "Shin Bet Law") that would allow GSS
interrogators to employ physical means came before the legislature
immediately after the HCJ handed down its decision, and Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Barak came out publicly in favor of such
legislation. '88
By all accounts, the proposed Shin Bet Law mirrored the
Landau Report recommendations, in that it established
mechanisms to ensure that GSS interrogators did not exceed the
powers granted to them, and it provided guidelines for prosecuting
those who did exceed their grant.189 The proposed law would have
also restricted the types of detainees against whom physical means
could be used, and required GSS interrogators to receive
authorization from the attorney general, upon a showing that the
interrogee was a "walking time bomb," before the use of force
would be permitted.' 90
Critics attacked the proposal on the same grounds as they
attacked the Landau Report, because they feared that Israel would
become "the only country in the world with a law permitting the
use of torture."' 9' Fortunately, the proposal may have become less
of an issue. Recent news reports indicate that on February 17,
2000, GSS chief Ami Ayalon withdrew his request for the passage
of the Shin Bet legislation. 192 Ayalon withdrew the request in
exchange for additional funding that will enable the GSS to
increase its staff, improve its facilities and upgrade technology.' 93
Just because the GSS is no longer demanding the proposed
legislation does not mean the legislature cannot pass it anyway,
but for the time being, the "moderate" physical methods of
interrogation, challenged in Public Committee Against Torture in
187 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 3.
188 See Dayan, supra note 94.
189 See id.; see also Aidva Eldar, A ticking time bomb of a question, HA'ARETZ,
Feb.16, 2000, available in 2000 WL 7218106.
190 See Eldar, supra note 189; see also Dayan, supra note 94.
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Israel remain illegal.
C. International Concerns
Given that the Israeli legislature has essentially been given the
green light to nullify the effect of the HCJ decision in the principal
case, so long as it does not violate the Israeli Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, this last substantive section of the Note will
discuss how the international legal community might view such a
move by the legislature. For purposes of this section, assume that
any new legislation passed by the Israeli legislature would allow
for the same "moderate" use of force as was recommended by the
Landau Commission.
Recall that Israel signed and ratified both the UN International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of 1966 (UN Covenant on
Civil Rights), and the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Convention against Torture).' 94 The major developed democratic
nations of the world are also parties to these agreements. 95 The
European nations are additionally parties to their own European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
196
Each of the three agreements unconditionally prohibits torture, and
the European Convention goes further and bans the employment
of ill treatment. 97 According to the UN Human Rights Committee,
article 7 of the UN Covenant on Civil Rights, which prohibits the
use of torture and ill treatment, is not subject to limitation "even in
situations of public emergency."'98  Only with regard to the
Convention Against Torture is it arguable that the prohibition of ill
treatment is not absolute, because the drafters themselves could
not agree on that issue.' 99 Even so, article 16 of that convention
194 See supra notes 119-42 and accompanying text.
195 See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21" Sess., (1966); see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39h Sess., 93"' mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984).
196 See Chart of Signatures & Ratifications, (last updated Feb. 11, 1999)
<http://www.coe.fr/tablconv/5t.http>.
197 See supra notes 119-36, 144-46 and accompanying text.
198 Position Paper, supra note 108, at 19 (quoting U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, U.N. Doe. A/47/40 (1994).
199 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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requires that parties take steps to prevent such acts. o Given its
international obligations, Israel has very little room to argue to the
international community that it has any justification for passing a
law that allows GSS interrogators to use even "moderate" force
against any of its interrogees.
It is argued that the use of "moderate" force pursuant to
supervisory approval and only when necessary to extract
information regarding a threat to the general public might not rise
to the level of torture or ill treatment.'O°  Use shaking as an
example of the allowable "moderate" force. If shaking, as
employed by the GSS, causes "serious pain or suffering" it
constitutes torture under the Convention Against Torture.20 ' As the
ECHR has held, however, the special "stigma" of torture applies
only where action results in "very serious or cruel suffering.,
203
Perhaps then, the shaking, as recommended by the Landau Report
and criminalized by the HCJ, does not rise to the level of "torture."
Torture is not the only prohibited action under at least two of the
three relevant international agreements, however. The more
difficult, if not impossible, argument to make is that shaking does
not constitute prohibited ill treatment.
Although "cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" is not defined under the Convention Against Torture,
article 16 of the convention requires that states "undertake to
prevent such acts. 2 04 The ECHR has held such ill treatment is
prohibited if it reaches a certain level of severity to be determined
on the totality of the circumstances. The inquiry into the totality
of the circumstances does not include consideration of the reasonfor th . . .. 206for the interrogation. The method of shaking which can cause
200 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
21 See Principal Case, supra note 1, 1 15 (attorneys for the state make this
argument). Remember, only under the Convention Against Torture is there even the
possibility that the distinction between torture and ill treatment is relevant to the
determination of whether a violation has taken place. See supra notes 126-136 and
accompanying text.
202 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 39' Sess., 93' mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46 (1984).
203 Aydin v. Turkey, 25 EHRR 251 (Decision) 182 (1997).
204 See supra note 134-45 and accompanying text.
205 See Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, 26 EHRR 477 (Decision) % 76 (1998).
206 The reason for an investigation would only be relevant to the extent that a valid
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severe headaches and may cause the head and neck to dangle and
vacillate would certainly constitute ill treatment under any of the
three relevant international agreements, and would therefore be
prohibited absolutely or at the very least condemned in a general
sense.
Even if Israel is in violation of its duties as a party to these
international agreements, the agreements, though ratified, have not
been specifically adopted into Israeli law.207 These are considered
conventional international agreements, and not agreements that
simply declare customary international law principles. Even
customary international law is only considered part of Israeli law
to the extent that it does not contradict a law passed by the
legislature 8.20  But if it is true that Israeli judges presume that the
legislature does not intend to violate Israeli obligations
internationally,2 9 then at the very least, the HCJ should consider
the language of the international agreements, which the Israeli
legislature has ratified, as consistent with the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, which the legislature passed, in the event that
the Court is asked to weigh any subsequent legislation against the
Basic Law.
The most compelling evidence that Israeli arguments to the
international community would fall on deaf ears, should the
Knesset pass legislation authorizing the GSS to use "moderate"
force during interrogations, comes directly from the bodies that
oversee party obligations under the relevant international
agreements. In 1998, the UN Human Rights Committee reported
that Israeli practices consistent with the Landau Report
recommendations violated article 7 of the UN Covenant on Civil
Rights. ° In 1995 and again in 1997, the Committee Against
defense to the use of ill treatment existed. Because ill treatment is absolutely barred by
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the reason for
the interrogation becomes irrelevant. See supra notes 146-56 (discussing the absolute
bar on ill treatment and various examples of what does or does not constitute such
treatment).
207 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
208 See id.; see also HARNON & STEIN, supra note 112, at 218-19 (listing those
international agreements that the Knesset Israel has ratified but not formally adopted as
law).
209 See id. at 219.
210 See Position Paper, supra note 107, at 27 (citing Human Rights Committee,
Concluding Observations, 1998, Israel).
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Torture (CAT) made the same findings with respect to the
Convention against Torture.21   Among the practices that
constituted violations in all instances included violent shaking, and
imposition of the "Shabach" position.2  The CAT accompanied
its 1997 findings with the following comment:
The Committee acknowledges the terrible dilemma Israel
confronts in dealing with terrorist threats to its security, but as a
State party to the Convention Israel is precluded from raising
before this committee exceptional circumstances as justifications
for acts prohibited by article 1 of the Convention.
2
V. Conclusion
Human rights activists have vigorously applauded the decision
in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel. In reality,
however, the High Court's decision is only a tiny step towards
prohibiting the use of torture and ill treatment during GSS
interrogations of suspected terrorists. Nevertheless, the Court
noted the difficulty in taking that step.
We are aware that this decision does not ease dealing with [the]
harsh reality [of terrorism]. This is the destiny of a democracy,
as not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices
employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a
democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back,
it nonetheless has the upper hand.!
14
Presumably, if additional physical interrogation practices are
challenged the Court will find them illegal as well, and on the
same grounds as in the principal case. What is uncertain is
whether the Israeli legislature will respond to the principal
decision by passing a statute, and if so what the statute would
authorize, and whether the HCJ would strike the statute upon
review. So, not only does the decision represent just a small step
towards Israeli compliance with its international agreements, but
even that step appears subject to nullification by the legislature. If
Israel passes a statute allowing for the use of force in
interrogations, and if the statute is upheld, Israel will sit alone
211 See id. at 25-26.
212 See id. at 26-27.
213 Id. at 26 (quoting Committee Against Torture, Special Report submitted by
Israel, 1997, Concluding Observations, 4-6).
214 Principal Case, supra note 1, 39.
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among the democracies of the world as authorizing such
practices.215
MATTHEW G. ST. AMAND
215 See Israel's Shin Bet Drops Demand for "Torture Law, " supra note 191.
